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“Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions
for people to be healthy.”2 In the abstract, the vast majority of Americans believe in
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public health and support public health goals.3 More than three and a half decades
ago, this attitude prompted Congress to establish “a separate standard for coverage of
children within Medicaid” in order to facilitate baby well-care.4 However, despite
occasional preventive measures such as this, in reality, public health has been an
orphan in the United States for quite some time. Much of this is due to America’s
reliance on the sickness model of health, which emphasizes reactive, individual
medicine as opposed to prevention in the aggregate. Absent some emergency or
visible health threat, the American public has been quite complacent in its support of
preventative public health, whose positive effects, unlike those of curative medicine,
are largely invisible.5
This complacency, which began to wane as recent threats of anti-microbial
resistance and the West Nile virus emerged, came to a screeching halt in 2001, with
the events of September 11th and the anthrax scare.6 These events have catapulted
public health to the forefront of homeland security,7 and have signaled a definite
policy shift toward preparedness.8 As public health preparedness becomes an
increasingly prominent issue on the political landscape, “the balance between public
health and civil liberties, which in recent decades had been tilting more toward
individual freedom, may be about to swing back.”9 While the tension of “freedom
removed for future freedom retained”10 has been a timeless struggle in the history of
democracy, the modern trend toward questioning authority figures in medicine and
government has prompted a heightened awareness of the restrictions on civil liberties
2
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 13 (University of
California Press 2000) [hereinafter “POWER”] (citing INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC
HEALTH 58 (1988)).
3

Barry S. Levy, Twenty-First Century Challenges for Law and Public Health, 32 IND. L.
REV. 1149, 1150 (1999).
4
Elizabeth J. Jameson & Elizabeth Wehr, Drafting National Health Care Reform
Legislation to Protect the Health Interests of Children, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 152, 152
(1993).
5

Levy, supra note 3, at 1150.

6

David P. Fidler, Lawrence O. Gostin’s Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 1
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 303, 303 (2001) (book review) [hereinafter “Review”].
7
Eleanor D. Kinney, Administrative Law and the Public’s Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
212, 212 (2002). “The perpetration of bio-terrorism in the United States in 2001 has been
singularly important in raising awareness about the national and global importance of public
health.” David P. Fidler, Introduction to Written Symposium on Public Health and
International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2002) [hereinafter “Written Symposium”].
8

David P. Fidler, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 7,
10 (2002) [hereinafter “Public Health”].
9

Liz Marlantes, Bioterror: All the Rules Change, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 17, 2001,
at 1. I think we may have already seen some of this pendulum swing with the 2004
presidential election. Homeland security, as an offshoot of terrorism, was among the issues of
most concern in the election. See Steven Thomma & Knight Ridder, Americans Differ on
Whether President Bush Has a Mandate, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 14, 2004, at 1.
10

Carolyn D. Amadon et al., The Erosion of Constitutional Rights in the Wake of 9/11, 17MAR CBA REC. 24 (2003).
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that an effective public health system might require, and an increased willingness to
challenge the propriety of these trade-offs.11
This article explores the tensions between creating an effective public health
system that would be able to respond to and protect against any public health threat,
and protecting individuals against unnecessary intrusions on their civil liberties. It
then considers approaches to this issue that might best strike a balance in a
democratic society. While many Americans may recognize and even accept that
greater security would entail some intrusion into individual rights, there is no
formula for striking the appropriate balance. This article attempts to arrive at a
workable framework by examining how the United States’ public health system
works. This includes reviewing its policy response to several recent public health
threats, exposing the shortcomings of the current system, and comparing it to the
approach of other democratic and non-democratic societies. Based upon this review
and analysis, the article suggests an approach that might best incorporate effective
techniques from a variety of alternative systems, while addressing some of the main
problems of the current framework. This analysis is broken down into seven main
parts.
Part I provides an introduction to public health and the essential components of
an effective system. It explains why public health historically has not been high on
the priority list of medical approaches to combating disease, and describes how this
view of public health has evolved, particularly in recent years. Part II examines
some of the shortcomings of the United States’ public health system as it currently
stands.
Part III introduces the central controversy between civil liberties and a strong
public health system by focusing on three of the most commonly used tools of public
health authorities, namely: quarantines, mandatory screening and immunization, and
health information sharing, as well as their effects on liberty and freedom of
movement, individual autonomy, and privacy. Part IV builds on this analysis and
explores how the United States historically has struck a balance between these
competing considerations by examining orders and legislation arising out of recent
public health threats such as AIDS, SARS, and 9/11.
Part V investigates other approaches to resolving the tensions between public
health and civil liberties by reviewing the approach advocated by one renown public
health expert, Lawrence Gostin, and the response of Canadian and Singaporean
societies to the threat of SARS. Part VI continues to explore alternatives, focusing
solely on the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (“MSEHPA”), developed
in response to 9/11. Finally, Part VII identifies the shortcomings of MSEHPA and
recommends amendments to MSEHPA that might help to strike a better balance for
the American people. Addressing the criticisms and concerns voiced by the
American public is an essential step toward creating a viable, stronger public health
system going forward.

11
“Governmental power and emergency measures that people may have found necessary
and acceptable during the plague years of the First World War are no longer easily supported
by a citizenry sensitized to civil rights by the change in our culture that transpired during the
last half of the Twentieth Century.” Deborah L. Erickson et al., The Power to Act: Two Model
State Statutes, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 57, 62 (2002).
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I. BACKGROUND
Public health differs from traditional health care in several respects. Some of its
distinguishing features include a focus on: “(1) the health and safety of populations
rather than . . . individual patients; (2) [the] prevention of injury and disease rather
than treatment[;] . . . (3) [the] relationship between government and the community
rather than physician and patient; and (4) services grounded on [sic] . . . scientific
methodologies of public health (e.g. . . . epidemiology) rather than personal medical
services.”12 The Institute of Medicine’s definition of public health, set forth at the
beginning of this article,13 reinforces these distinguishing characteristics by
emphasizing a mutuality of obligation lying with the government and community as
a whole, and focusing on increasing the incidence of conditions that facilitate healthy
living as opposed to guaranteeing health itself.14 People often fail to appreciate the
benefits of public health, because the effects of prevention are usually invisible.
However, a strong public health system is essential to the welfare of any society, and
has accounted for approximately “twenty-five of the thirty years of increased life
expectancy in the United States since the turn of the century.”15 The importance of
public health to American society has been underscored by the events of September
11th, which confirmed that terrorist attacks, with the potential for biological warfare,
are very real threats.16
In order to deal with catastrophes like this effectively, a public health system
would have to, at a minimum, clearly articulate its objectives, and make their
realization as consistent as possible with the public mores of the American people.17
It is essential to the American public that its values and priorities are reflected in the
system.18 “A ‘shared understanding’ of public health’s goals [would be essential] to

12
Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: A Renaissance, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 136,
136 (2002) (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Renaissance”].
13

“Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for
people to be healthy.” POWER, supra note 2, at 13.
14

Lawrence O. Gostin, Conceptualizing the Field After September 11th: Foreword to a
Symposium on Public Health Law, 90 KY. L.J. 791, 794-95 (2002) [hereinafter “September
11th”].
15

Levy, supra note 3, at 1150. Other things that have been positively impacted by public
health include cleaner drinking water, more nutritious meals, safer workplaces, and less
polluting vehicles. Id. at 1140.
16
Carol M. Ostrom, Bioterrorism Scare Here Adds Urgency to Conference: National
Experts Discuss Coordination, Legal Rights, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at B1.
17

See James F. Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 170, 172 (2002).
18

This can be accomplished in more than one fashion. A public health system can be
developed according to what is known of society’s values. The sharp division in social values
between the more liberal and more conservative factions in the United States at the present
time, however, makes this a difficult task. In the alternative, since some of these values are
contradictory and may lead to an ineffective system, getting the public’s support for a system
may require some more adroit advertising.
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avoiding ‘mass pandemonium.’”19 Likewise, public health, by its very nature,
requires an investment in and support of preparedness.20
Historically, however, public health has not been high on the priority list of
medical interventions for the American people. As a field of legal analysis, for
example, it has largely been ignored due to its “broad, diffuse scope and immense
complexity.”21 Moreover, the American public tends to be results-oriented in its
view of medical care, valuing tangibility and immediacy of consequences over
prevention, and, therefore, has focused on a sickness model of medicine that favors
curative medicine rather than prevention.
As a result, resources are
disproportionately allocated to support the former endeavor.
These conditions have led to a situation where there seems to be a “‘virtually
bottomless purse for treating illness’ by medical means and [only a] paucity of public
provisions to prevent it or ensure the conditions for which people can be healthy.”22
The reason for this disparity is tied to the public’s perception of need.
[I]n the absence of real or perceived crises, most media and public
attention tends to focus considerably more on the individual flesh-andblood stories of medical care than on public health topics that concern ‘the
commons,’ such as health promotion and disease prevention, to which it is
generally difficult to attach specific faces.23
Therefore, while most people have historically supported a high level of public
health, at least in the abstract, “fewer [have been] eager to pay for it, and many [have
been] positively opposed to changing their own activities to promote it.”24 Until
now.
Although the pendulum has swung quite heavily in favor of individual rights in
recent decades,25 “[m]any Americans have come to rethink the role of government
and the importance of the public health safety system.”26 September 11th and the
19

Ostrom, supra note 16.

20

“[P]revention through preparation is essential.” James G. Hodge, Jr., Bioterrorism Law
and Policy: Critical Choices in Public Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 254, 254 (2002).
21

Review, supra note 6, at 304.

22

Bernard M. Dickens, A Tool For Teaching and Scholarship: A Review of Lawrence
Gostin’s Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 162, 168 (2002)
(book review).
23

Marshall B. Kapp, Lawrence Gostin’s Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 22 J.
LEGAL MED. 581, 581 (2001) (book review).
24

Dickens, supra note 22, at 168.

25

The HIV epidemic has sharpened the timeless tension between public health and civil
liberties, and “[t]o many, . . . the pendulum has swung decidedly in favor of civil liberties” in
recent decades. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The “Names Debate”: The Case
for National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679, 682 (1998) [hereinafter
“Names Debate”].
26
September 11th, supra note 14, at 793. With respect to confidence in government, a poll
of ninety-nine Americans taken after 9/11 indicated that approximately fifty-eight percent
either had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the United States government’s ability to
protect its citizens from future terrorist attacks, while only ten had very little. Similarly,
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subsequent anthrax scare have illustrated the importance of rapidly detecting and
reacting to the threats of bio-terrorism and infectious disease.27 Even more
significantly, these disasters have made it clear that individuals acting alone cannot
effectively protect against many public health threats to their well-being.28
Accordingly, “[i]n the aftermath of anthrax [and 9/11] . . . [w]e may witness a
shift from a weak national commitment to public health to a strong effort on
homeland security, in which public health plays an important part.”29 There seems to
be a renewed enthusiasm for preparedness and a greater support for governmental
efforts to safeguard security. American attitudes concerning public health have
already been evolving. One of the best indicators of the public’s stance on any issue
is political action.30 Since 9/11, legislators in Washington DC have illustrated their
dedication to the cause of public health as a matter of national security by passing
several bio-terrorism bills.31 Among these is the Public Health Threats and
Emergencies Act, which set aside over $500 million for bio-terrorism preparedness
in 2001.32 Even on the state level, public health values, such as individual freedom
yielding to the public good,33 are being increasingly reflected in legislation.34 Public

ninety-one of one-hundred-and-one believed the government could protect the liberties of
Americans while ten thought it could not. See Blendon, NPR/Kaiser Family
Foundation/Kennedy School of Government Civil Liberties, at http://www.npr.org/programs
/specials/poll/civil_liberties/ civil _liberties_ static_ results_2.html [hereinafter “Blendon”].
With respect to feelings about public health, a RobertWood Johnson Foundation national
survey conducted October 20-30, 2002 found that three-fourths of Americans are concerned
about the strain on America’s public health system, and most support increasing federal
funding for public health, even through higher taxes. RobertWood Johnson Foundation, How
Public Health has Changed Since 9-11, at http://www.rwjf.org/portofolios/features/feature
detail.jsp?featureID=50&type=3&iaid=141 (last visited Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter
“RobertWood”].
27
September 11th, supra note 14, at 792. “A recent national poll suggests that 70 percent
of the public believes a subsequent biological or chemical attack on the United States will
occur in the next year.” Hodge, supra note 20, at 256.
28

September 11th, supra note 14, at 793.

29

Public Health, supra note 8, at 23.

30

While some political action is admittedly prompted by intense pressure from a small but
notable group of influential members of the public, my less cynical belief is that much
political action is still an outgrowth of widespread public opinion and insistence.
31

Public Health, supra note 8, at 11. “On January 10, 2002, President Bush signed into
law a $2.9 billion bioterrorism appropriations bill.” Id.
32

Hodge, supra note 20, at 254.

33

20 N.Y. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 215 (2003).

34

Many states are considering and adopting variations of the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act, which is described infra Part VI. “For the first time in a half-century,
authorities are considering the legality and practicality of extreme measures, such as requiring
the public to be tested for diseases or seizing property.” Marlantes, supra note 9.
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health and the seemingly necessary intrusion on civil liberties may slowly be
climbing the ladder of prominence in the lives of the American people.35
II. WEAKNESSES OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
With renewed attention being focused on public health, it is becoming
increasingly clearer that the United States’ system, as it currently stands, needs more
than tweaking; it needs an entirely new conceptual foundation. The first major
problem with the public health system in the United States is one of capacity. For
example, in Washington, the Board of Health found that only thirty percent of its
counties had isolation protocols in place in their hospitals, and even fewer had selfcontained air systems sufficient to isolate contagious patients.36 As a whole, “[s]tate
and local agencies [across the United States] have inadequate and incomplete
surveillance capacity, antiquated data systems, technologically inferior laboratories,
and an under-trained, under-qualified workforce.”37 Much of these “glaring
deficiencies in the public health infrastructure”38 are due to grossly inadequate
funding and a lack of strong public support for the cause, which, according to
respected surveys,39 is only now beginning to change.40
The second major problem with the public health infrastructure in the United
States is legal. Lawrence Gostin has identified three main problems with public
health laws as a whole, namely: (1) antiquity, (2) multiple layers of law, and (3)
inconsistency among the states and territories.41
A. Problem of Antiquity
Much of public health law was enacted in the late nineteenth and early to midtwentieth century, predating significant advancements in scientific understanding and
constitutional law.42 As a result, “[t]hese laws often do not reflect contemporary
scientific understandings of injury and disease . . . or legal norms for protection of
individual rights.”43 Instead, today’s public health laws reflect a mindset that
existed, in some cases, one hundred years earlier. For example, many state
quarantine laws do not afford individuals any sort of due process, whether in the

35

Americans are generally notably concerned that the public health system provide
preventive measures like immunizations, health education, and chronic disease prevention.
“[A]t least seven in 10 people say that each of these is a very important activity.” See
RobertWood, supra note 26.
36

Ostrom, supra note 16.

37

September 11th, supra note 14, at 796.

38

Id.

39

See, e.g., RobertWood, supra note 26.

40
September 11th, supra note 14, at 796. “Before the recent infusion of federal funds, the
government allocated only approximately one percent of all health dollars to traditional public
health services.” Id. at 797. See RobertWood, supra note 26.
41

See POWER, supra note 2, at 317-19.

42

Id. at 317.

43

Renaissance, supra note 12, at 137.
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form of a right to challenge a governmental action, or a hearing, for the deprivation
of liberty associated with quarantines.44
B. Problem of Multiple Layers of Law
While most public health laws have not undergone substantial revision since their
enactment, they have been amended over the years to respond to specific health
threats.45 This piecemeal legislation has created a system where public health
officials are accorded different levels of authority according to varying scales of
criteria that change with the type of disease.46 This disparate structure creates
confusion in the understanding and application of the law to contemporary health
threats.47
Additionally, it leads to occasionally absurd results, such as a
Massachusetts law maintaining the penalty for resisting a quarantine order at ten
dollars.48
C. Problem of Inconsistency
“Public health laws remain fragmented not only within states but among them.”49
Each of the states’ health codes has evolved independently; accordingly, they exhibit
profound variations among them, both in structure and in substance.50 Since state
borders are artificial boundaries when it comes to disease, these differences become
problematic when trying to launch a coordinated response to a widespread threat.
D. Problem of Lack of Authority
Finally, many of the state officials who have been charged with scrutinizing
public health laws across the nation in an effort to better prepare their states for the
future have cited a fourth, more fundamental legal obstacle to a stronger public
health system. They argue that even a nationally coordinated response would be
insufficient to develop an effective public health system because there is a
fundamental “lack [of] adequate authority to combat a major bio-terror event.”51
Due to its civil liberties implications, it is this issue, more than any other, which has
engendered controversy in the search for a more effective system.52 This article will

44
Ceci Connolly, Bush Smallpox Inoculation Plan Near Standstill: Medical Professionals
Cite Possible Side Effects, Uncertainty of Threat, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 24, 2003, at A06,
available at http://www.Washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=Feb23
&notFound=true (last visited Dec. 19, 2005).
45

See Renaissance, supra note 12, at 137.

46

See POWER, supra note 2, at 318.

47

Id. at 319.

48

Marlantes, supra note 9.

49

POWER, supra note 2, at 319.

50

Id.

51

Marlantes, supra note 9. This lack of authority is due to a multitude of factors, which
include, among other things, federalism and overly burdensome privacy statutes.
52
Another controversial aspect, which is more practical than legal, is cost. After all,
creating a more effective public health system costs money, and people do not like to give
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focus on the tension between greater authority and the necessary intrusion into civil
liberties that it occasions.
III. PUBLIC HEALTH VS. CIVIL LIBERTIES TENSIONS
Adequately addressing the identified weaknesses of the United States’ public
health system will involve some friction with individual rights.53 For example
affording public health officials an expansion of authority, will, of necessity, intrude
on the protection of civil liberties. More governmental power almost invariably
corresponds to less individual liberty; “[i]t is not a new equation.”54 Likewise, some
of the most popular and commonly used public health measures around the world—
namely quarantines, mandatory screening and immunization, and health information
sharing—all intrude upon civil liberties to one extent or another.
Notwithstanding the utility of these tools, and despite their potential value to
rebuilding our nation’s public health system, “the shaping of public health policy and
practice should never occur without careful consideration of the burden such policies
would have for the rights of individuals.”55 In order to fully understand the
implications of the tensions between public health measures and civil liberties, which
some are calling the greatest dilemma now facing the nation,56 it is useful to take a
closer look at each of the following three responses, (1) quarantines, (2) mandatory
screening and immunization, and (3) health information sharing, individually, in
order to balance their usefulness against the burdens they impose. Only then can
their place in modern United States’ policy be assessed.
A. Quarantines
The modern definition of quarantine is “[a] restriction of the activities of healthy
persons who have been exposed to a communicable disease, during its period of
communicability, to prevent disease transmission during the incubation period if
infection should occur.”57 The quarantine, as a tool of public health, has a long
history dating all the way back to the Bible’s Leviticus 13,58 which discusses
money to government programs without seeing results. As mentioned earlier in this paper, see
infra page 1, the results of prevention are often invisible.
53

Even New York’s jurisprudence acknowledges that “[t]he right to preserve the public
health, to protect the public morals, and to provide for the public safety, may interfere to some
extent with both liberty and property.” 20 N.Y. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 207 (2003).
54

Amadon et al., supra note 10.

55
Ronald Bayer, Tom Stoddard, Public Health, and Civil Liberties: A Remembrance, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1034, 1036 (1997). This is important not just because it is the right thing to
do, but because the public’s buy-in is essential.
56

See Marlantes, supra note 9.

57

POWER, supra note 2, at 210 (emphasis added). Compare the definition of quarantine to
that of isolation, which is “the separation, for the period of communicability, of known
infected persons in such places and under such conditions as to prevent or limit the
transmission of the infectious agent.” Id. (emphasis added). The distinction between the two
is frequently not recognized, leading many to use the terms interchangeably.
58

Declan McCullagh, Something’s in the Air: Liberties in the Face of SARS and Other
Infectious Diseases, REASON, Aug. 1, 2003, at 33.
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isolation in the context of leprosy.59 Its primary function is to combat contagious
disease, and countries across the globe have used it, in varying degrees of severity, as
a method of self-preservation. In the fifteenth century, for example, the British
government used quarantines to fight the bubonic plague.60 Likewise, at various
times in history, both Bedloe’s and Ellis Islands of New York were sites of
quarantines.61
Despite their widespread use, quarantines are controversial because of their
intrusion into valued individual rights. Quarantines not only impact general liberty,
by hindering the freedom of mobility within society, but also personal autonomy, by
substituting the judgment of public health officials, acting as an extension of the
government, for that of individuals.62 Moreover, such measures tend to breed fear
and blame among the people in a community, frequently leading to the unjust
shunning of marginalized individuals and unpopular social groups.63 Overreaction,
particularly when it is prejudicial, is a daunting area of concern for those questioning
the propriety of such measures in a democratic society.64 On the other hand, “having
the ability to act forcefully to stop an epidemic could prove indispensable”65 to
saving people’s lives and preserving the social infrastructure necessary for
maintaining public order. And while limiting a person’s freedom of movement, for
example, should not be taken lightly, there do not seem to be many alternatives in the
case of highly infectious communicable diseases.66
While the public’s view of quarantines seems mixed following 9/11, which
confirmed the possibility of future bio-terrorism, quarantines have historically
engendered significant resistance and controversy.67 Moreover, unlike many Asian
countries like Singapore and China, where the governments are authoritarian and the
expectation of civil liberties is much lower, quarantines have never been widely used
in the United States.68 Renewed consideration of this measure, therefore, raises a

59

Leviticus 13:4 (King James).

60

McCullagh, supra note 58.

61

Id.

62

POWER, supra note 2, at 219.

63

Id. at 208. In 1892, the New York City Port Authority quarantined a ship of immigrants
from Europe by forcing poor passengers to remain sequestered below the deck in unsanitary
conditions. Fifty-eight of the sequestered passengers perished on the vessel. Marlantes, supra
note 9.
64

McCullagh, supra note 58.

65

Stephen Smith, US Allows for SARS Quarantines Health Officials Say None are Planned
Yet, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 2003, at A2.
66

McCullagh, supra note 58.

67

Marlantes, supra note 9.

68

“Although quarantines have been applied on occasion in limited circumstances, broad
quarantines have never been used in the United States . . . . ” Lorena Matei, Quarantine
Revision and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: “Laws for the Common Good,”
18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 433, 435 (2002).
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host of “political and ethical questions in a mobile society”69 that extend beyond
intrusions into civil liberties. These deserve attention before any significant policy
decisions are made.70
B. Mandatory Screening and Immunization
“Laws mandating immunization first appeared [in the United States] in the early
nineteenth century.”71 Like quarantines, mandatory immunizations are aimed at
combating infectious disease, only through prevention. Vaccinations are currently
among the most cost-effective and widely used preventive measures against
disease.72 Similarly, “[d]isease screening is one of the most basic tools of modern
public health and preventive medicine . . . [with] a long and distinguished history in
efforts to control epidemics of infectious diseases and targeting treatment for chronic
diseases.”73 Screening involves the medical testing of a defined population, and is
undertaken for broader public health purposes than mere diagnosis.74 Despite their
utility, both of these public health measures, immunization and screening, have long
sparked popular resistance and controversy from the public, with attitudes ranging
from sharp suspicion to appreciative enthusiasm.75
The root of the discord stems from the underlying observation that “[t]he power
of government to compel individuals to receive approved materials into their bodies
and to surrender materials from their bodies is necessary from a public health
perspective, and necessarily objectionable from a civil liberties perspective.”76 Both
of these interventions, mandatory immunization and screening, impact rights to
personal autonomy and privacy; however, they also provide a tremendous benefit.
With respect to immunization, using it as a form of prevention is almost always
less costly, physically as well as financially, than treating an illness on a case-bycase basis after it develops and has the opportunity to spread. This is particularly
69

Id.

70

While a quarantine is inherently intrusive, there are ways of limiting the extent of its
intrusion into civil liberties by regulating aspects of its scope and length.
71

POWER, supra note 2, at 181.

72

Id. at 180. Just last year, the state of Illinois added chickenpox to its list of required
immunizations for children in school and/or daycare, bringing the total number of required
vaccinations to nine. See Kevin McDermott, Chickenpox Vaccine Will be Required; Children
Entering Kindergarten or Day Care are Affected, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 11, 2002, at
B1.
73

POWER, supra note 2, at 187 (quoting the INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 2).

74

Id. at 188.

75

See Marlantes, supra note 9 for commentary identifying some of the greatest successes
and failures in the history of immunizations. One of the most prominent recent illustrations of
this resistance was the public’s reaction to President Bush’s smallpox vaccination program.
“Although the federal government . . . shipped 274,000 doses of vaccine to states since the
program began Jan. 24, 2003 hundreds of hospitals, a half-dozen major unions and even some
public health departments . . . refused to participate . . . . [T]he vast majority of medical
professions remain[ed] unconvinced that the threat of a smallpox attack [was] serious enough
to administer a vaccine known for its serious side effects.” Connolly, supra note 44.
76

Dickens, supra note 22, at 167.
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true for ailments, such as chickenpox, which are very common and tend to be
concentrated in a certain segment of the population.77 On the other hand, forcibly
injecting a pathogen into one’s body is a very intimate form of bodily intrusion that
is frequently objectionable from a religious, as well as a privacy, standpoint.
Additionally, the measure involves a level of risk that, in some cases, could be
considerable, and may result in major bodily harm and/or even death.78 While there
is no guaranteed constitutional protection against this, it is becoming less of an issue
as all state immunization laws now excuse children who are known to be more
susceptible to having an adverse reaction, and most states make exceptions for those
articulating sincere religious objections.79
Mandatory screening, for its part, also plays an important role in promoting
public health. Modern public health is grounded in the scientific foundation of
epidemiology, which, in turn, is based on studies of the prevalence and character of
disease in various populations. The primary justification for such an intrusive
measure is society’s interest in health and safety.80 However, the benefits of
screening depend on several variables, which include, among other things, the
reliability of the particular test and the frequency of its false positive results.81 These
must be weighed against some of the primary objections, which include a veritable
violation of bodily integrity and privacy, as well as possible stigmatization.82
C. Health Information Sharing
“[T]he amount of personal medical information that is routinely disclosed [in
American society] has become enormous.”83 Such records invariably contain
sensitive information concerning everything from a person’s behavior and genetic

77
The underlying impetus for mandatory immunization is really an externality principle. It
is not as much for the individual child’s benefit (though this is also a consideration), as it is for
the broader public good. When children are vaccinated, it provides great benefits to all those
they come into contact with. This is a positive externality.
78

In 1954, a faulty batch of the new polio vaccine resulted in the paralysis of 200 hundred
young children. Marlantes, supra note 9.
79

POWER, supra note 2, at 181. This illustrates one way in which the government has
struck a balance between this particular public health intrusion and civil liberties.
80
See id. at 196. The knowledge obtained from screenings helps to educate officials about
the characteristics and transmission of a given disease. This, in turn, aids officials in
developing preventive strategies.
81

See id. at 189.

82

See id. at 188. This issue is particularly salient with respect to HIV screening of
newborns since “determining the HIV status of [a] newborn automatically establishes the HIV
status of the mother.” Linda Farber Post, Note, Unblinded Mandatory HIV Screening of
Newborns: Care or Coercion?, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 169, 173 (1994). As with all public
health measures, however, there are ways of minimizing the level of intrusiveness by
adopting, for example, strict privacy guidelines regulating the use and dispersion of such
information.
83
Eric Wymore, It’s 1998, Do You Know Where Your Medical Records Are? Medical
Record Privacy After the Implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 553, 554 (1998).
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profile to their socio-economic status.84 This free flow of information has many
positive aspects. From a public health perspective, information concerning
demographics, public benefit eligibility, current health status, and lifestyle choices is
all very helpful for developing strategies to promote public health.85 Additionally,
access by insurers helps them to combat fraud in the industry and access by
employers can help to ensure “the accommodation and safety of workers, as required
by the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Occupational Safety and Health
Act.”86 On the other hand, health information sharing also has very serious privacy
implications, and privacy seems to be an issue of some concern to the American
people.
In 1996, the public’s interest in the privacy of health information prompted the
government to enact the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”), which was intended to facilitate access to health insurance and combat
fraud in the health care industry while establishing more stringent privacy safeguards
to protect electronic exchanges of health information.87 Then in 1999, a Wall Street
Journal poll revealed that the issue most feared by Americans in the upcoming
century was “erosion of personal privacy.”88 It received twenty-nine percent of the
vote with no other issue scoring more than twenty-three percent.89 While the
September 11th attacks on America shifted that focus somewhat, it remains an issue
of concern.90 And there is some indication that this concern over privacy may not be
unfounded. Public health officials have admitted that HIPAA has loopholes,91 and
many hospitals simply do not have sufficient safeguards in place to guarantee
privacy.92 Moreover, mishandling confidential medical information could have dire
consequences for individuals, which range from embarrassment and loss of selfesteem to loss of employment and/or insurance.93 Striking a balance is a delicate
procedure that is very tough to do.

84

POWER, supra note 2, at 131.

85

Id. Names-based AIDS reporting is one example of a successful health information
sharing campaign that helped to determine the disease’s cause and effect on those affected.
Names Debate, supra note 25, at 698.
86

Wymore, supra note 83, at 555.

87

See id. at 566-73 for a more detailed discussion of HIPAA.

88
Peter P. Swire & Lauren B. Steinfeld, Security and Privacy After September 11: The
Health Care Example, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1515 (2002).
89

Id.

90

See id. at 1515-516.

91

Among some of the exceptions to the rule for patient permission before disclosure of
medical records are national priorities purposes, national emergencies, and compliance with
court orders. See id. at 1530-533.
92
Avram Goldstein, A Behind-the-Scenes Force for Privacy; For Leader of D.C.-Based
Project, Protecting Confidentiality of Medical Records is ‘Lifelong Endeavor,’ WASH. POST,
Apr. 28, 2003, at A21.
93

POWER, supra note 2, at 131.
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Reviewing the tensions between public health and civil liberties inherent in
quarantines, mandatory screening and immunization, and health information sharing,
makes it clear that there is much to consider when balancing these values. It is
difficult to predict how the American public would react to the implementation of
these measures, with much depending on the context of the situation. On the one
hand, there are many historical examples of Americans sacrificing for the greater
good in times of war, for example.94 Similarly, there are many limitations on
individual rights that society has agreed to enforce in the name of public health, such
as seat belt requirements.95 On the other hand, “overreaction is [always] a threat
whenever governments face an apparent crisis;”96 authority can be carefully used or
wildly abused.97 Additionally, the American public is living in an age of
increasingly extensive civil liberties and is much more willing to challenge attempts
at curtailing these freedoms. To be effective, a public health system would have to
appreciate these realities.
IV. THE UNITED STATES’ METHOD OF HANDLING THESE TENSIONS
Recognizing the trade-offs inherent in various public health measures, it is useful
to examine how the United States has handled these tensions by reviewing
legislation arising out of several of the most dire public health crises in recent years,
namely: (1) the HIV/AIDS pandemic, (2) 9/11, and (3) SARS.
A. HIV/AIDS
Legislation arising out of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which is targeted at stopping
its spread, has taken on several forms including case reporting, partner notification,
and criminal penalties for knowingly exposing others to the virus.98 While each of
these plays a part in the fight against HIV/AIDS in many states, efforts have
concentrated primarily on case reporting, which involves monitoring individuals
infected with the disease.99 Whereas AIDS reporting received widespread support,
even from the infected community, from the moment of its implementation, HIV

94
Col. Thomas W. McShane, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Security, 23-DEC PA. LAW.
46, 46 (2001). This was particularly true during World War II and the Cold War.
95

Georges Benjamin, Wilfredo Lopez & Angela Zoe Monson, Partners in Public Health
Law: Elected Officials, Health Directors, and Attorneys, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 17, 21 (2002).
Other limitations include motorcycle helmet wearing requirements and no smoking laws. Id.
96

McCullagh, supra note 58.

97

Id. This potential for overreaction was realized during the recent anthrax scare when
several female employees of Michigan State University “were made to strip naked and stand
in a plastic wading pool to be decontaminated with a chlorine-bleach solution” after receiving
a suspicious letter. Marlantes, supra note 9.
98
Mark Hansen, Can the Law Stop AIDS? Through Penalties and Reporting Requirements,
Lawmakers Appear Determined to Regulate the Disease Out of Existence, 84 A.B.A.J. 26
(1998).
99
Id. HIV reporting is very similar in process to AIDS reporting. It involves physicians
and laboratories reporting evidence of HIV infection to local health officials who then forward
that information to the Centers for Disease Control. Names Debate, supra note 25, at 706.
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positive status reporting was met with considerable resistance.100 This is largely due
to the stigma attached to the designation of “HIV positive” that stays with often nonsymptomatic infected individuals for the rest of their lives, which, with modern
treatment techniques, could be quite long.101 Legislation mandating HIV reporting is
now widespread102 and enjoys broad-based support,103 with the only real debate
centered on whether reporting should be names-based or done through a code
system.104
As exemplified by the HIV/AIDS legislation, the United States Government
responded to this threat by striking the balance on the side of greater governmental
intervention. It considered the benefits of HIV surveillance, which include
assistance in targeting preventive services and facilitating access to counseling,
education, treatment, and voluntary partner notification services early-on,105 to
outweigh the adverse effects of potential stigmatization if a leak of information were
to occur.
However, the government has not fully heeded United States
Representative Thomas Coburn’s (R-OK) admonition that “it is time to stop treating
AIDS like a civil rights issue and start treating it like the public health crisis that it
is.”106 The government’s recognition of victims’ interest in privacy is the motivating
factor behind its efforts to explore alternative options to the names-based reporting
system that is now in place throughout most of the country.107
B. 9/11
On October 26, 2001, less than six weeks after the devastating events of
September 11th, President George W. Bush signed into law the USA Patriot Act,
which was designed to increase governmental powers of investigation and
enforcement so as to combat all modes of terrorism, including bio-terrorism.108
“[T]he USA Patriot Act [is], by all measures, one of the most sweeping and

100

Names Debate, supra note 25, at 696-97.

101

See id. at 698-99.

102

Id. at 705. “[A] majority of states have [now] implemented HIV reporting.” Id.

103

Hansen, supra note 98.

104

Names Debate, supra note 25, at 736-37.

105

Id. at 714-15.

106

Hansen, supra note 98. In fact, Rep. Thomas Coburn has advocated a bill permitting,
among other things, doctors and funeral homes to deny treatment to patients who are not tested
first, and requiring sex offenders to be tested within forty-eight hours of formally being
charged with a crime. Id.
107

Despite its original promise as an alternative, the non-named unique identifier code
system that has been implemented in several states has proven to be more costly and less
effective than the names-based system. According to a study promulgated by the states of
Maryland and Texas along with the Centers for Disease Control, the code system had “low
rates of completeness in reporting, . . . difficulty in conducting follow-up on specific cases,
and the absence of behavioral risk data.” Names Debate, supra note 25, at 740.
108

Lisa Finnegan Abdolian & Harold Takooshian, The USA Patriot Act: Civil Liberties,
the Media, and Public Opinion, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1429, 1429 (2003).
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controversial acts in United States history.”109 Its provisions include, among other
things, increased surveillance and wiretap authority, greater sharing of intelligence
among independent agencies, diminished due process for immigrants, and criminal
sanctions for the new crime of domestic terrorism.110 With respect to public health
specifically, it calls for an expansion of information sharing to facilitate a response to
bio-terror attacks, a grant program to support preparedness, upgrading surveillance
epidemiology, improving public health laboratories, and enhancing training of
healthcare professionals likely to be the first responders to bio-terrorist ploys.111 It
was passed by an overwhelming majority of the federal government and without
public debate at a time where “even a member of Congress would provoke cries of
heresy by questioning the President’s request for additional powers to catch the evildoers.”112
The Patriot Act unequivocally tips the scales in favor of governmental power and
intervention, “many would argue at the expense of individual liberties.”113
Nevertheless, despite the ease with which elected officials allowed provisions
formally declared by Congress to be too pro-surveillance to become law,114 the
American public is not yet ready to treat the Constitution like a rough draft.115 It is
true that there is mixed public sentiment over the sacrifice of individual liberties for
national security, as there generally is with respect to any topic of major concern;116
however, “[o]rganizations across the political spectrum, from village councils to
national advocacy groups, are [increasingly] going on record opposing this newest
potential assault on Americans’ civil liberties.”117 Some of the most controversial
surveillance provisions of the Act were set to sunset in 2004.118 The key was to
replace these provisions with less extreme measures focused on the common
objectives of security and privacy, which were not necessarily antagonistic.119
109

Id.

110

Id. at 1430-431. The definition of domestic terrorism includes “dangerous acts that
‘appear to be intended . . . to influence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion.’”
Id. at 1430 (quoting from USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 802, 115 Stat. 272,
376 (2001)).
111

USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001).

112

Abdolian & Takooshian, supra note 108, at 1437.

113

Id. at 1429.

114

Swire & Steinfeld, supra note 88, at 1516.

115
William E. Gibson, The Key to America’s Security: Should the United States Adopt
Israel’s Aggressive Approach to Ensure Homeland Security?, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 24, 2003,
at 1F.
116
As an example of the extent of mixed feelings, while some members of Congress are
rallying for greater protection of civil liberties, others have suggested modeling the United
States’ national security policy after Israel’s system, which takes an aggressive approach
toward terrorism. See id.
117

Matt Larson, Strange Bedfellows: What the ACLU and the NRA Have in Common, INST.
Sept. 1, 2003, at 6.

FOR PUB. AFFAIRS,
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Swire & Steinfeld, supra note 88, at 1517.

119

See id. at 1523.
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C. SARS
On April 4, 2003, “President Bush signed an executive order . . . allowing health
authorities to forcibly quarantine people potentially infected with severe acute
respiratory syndrome [SARS], the mystery ailment that killed at least 84 people and
infected more than 2,300 on five continents since it first appeared in China during
November, 2002.”120 It has been two decades since the nation’s list of infectious
diseases justifying forcible quarantine was last amended;121 “almost all quarantines in
recent decades had been voluntary.”122 Violations of the order carry the penalty of a
fine of up to $1000 and one year in prison.123 While public health officials clearly
have the authority to quarantine, none are anticipated in the immediate future.124
Allowing forcible quarantines certainly gives the government tremendous power
at the expense of personal autonomy. As discussed earlier,125 such a broad grant
presents dangers of civil liberties violations particularly where, as here, the disease
seems primarily concentrated in a particular subset of the population.126 However,
the legislative response may not be as unbalanced as it superficially may appear
considering SARS is a veritable weapon of mass destruction.127 After all, “[i]t only
takes one individual not complying to cause a real problem.”128 But it certainly lacks
the specificity of guidelines that is necessary to safeguard against civil liberties
violations.
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THESE TENSIONS
As a whole, the U.S. government’s reaction to each of the recent public health
threats was to augment its authority to take measures entailing the sacrifice of
individual freedoms. This was accomplished reactively, in piecemeal fashion, as a
response to whatever threat was endangering the public’s health at a specific time.
Notably, several of these measures provided the officials charged with enforcing

120

Smith, supra note 65.

121

Id. Other diseases on the list include cholera and the plague. See Exec. Order No.
13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255, 17,255 (Apr. 4, 2003).
122

Smith, supra note 65.

123

McCullagh, supra note 58.

124

Smith, supra note 65. “Public health experts are in wide agreement that U.S. officials
would always attempt voluntary isolation and quarantine” in the first instance. Ceci Connolly,
Laws Not Up to SARS Epidemic: Quarantining the Infected and the Exposed May Trample
Civil Liberties, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 26, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter, Civil Liberties].
125

See Part III.A, supra.

126

I do not mean to suggest that the Asian population is more susceptible to SARS, only
that they are more likely to be discriminated against because of the disease’s origination in
Asia, and the popular impression that Asian people are more likely to be carriers, at least in
the short term.
127
Nicholas D. Kristof, Civil Liberties? If They’re Really Sick, Lock ‘Em Up, THE
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, May 3, 2003, at 6. Also, health officials already quarantine
tuberculosis patients on a regular basis. Civil Liberties, supra note 124.
128

Civil Liberties, supra note 124.
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them little guidance regarding their use, thereby leaving them open to the possibility
of ready abuse.129 This course of action, with all of its benefits and faults, represents
the way the United States has dealt with the tensions between public health and civil
rights infringements in recent years. Before considering ways of improving upon
this system, it is important to recognize that there are alternative approaches, such as
those implemented internationally by countries like Singapore and Canada, and those
advocated by public health experts like Lawrence Gostin. Assessing these
alternative approaches for their efficacy in striking a balance in the face of similar
public health threats, such as SARS, provides a useful tool with which to more
critically evaluate the U.S. system.
A. Singapore: A Non-Democratic Alternative
The nation of Singapore provides a good illustration of the general approach of
non-democratic societies, which are not charged with the task of protecting
individual rights, to assaults on public health. When SARS hit the shores of
Singapore in the spring of 2003, the government responded swiftly, definitively, and
authoritatively.
It immediately implemented aggressive quarantines130 with
punishments for breaking them ranging from fines to imprisonment and the threat of
public identification.131 There was also electronic surveillance of those in isolation
through the use of web cameras and electronic tracking bracelets.132 “SARS patients
were allowed no visitors, and schools were closed.”133 Even foreign visitors were
forced to pass through a thermal scanner that, depending on the reading, could result
in their being quarantined for up to ten days.134 The government’s approach to the
problem was dictatorial and heavy-handed, but nonetheless very honest, proactive,
and effective for combating the disease.135
Singapore’s “single-minded determination to take whatever steps necessary to
stop the spread of the disease, with scant regard for such individual liberties as the
129

In fact, there have been numerous reports of civil rights violations against detainees
being held in New York City holding facilities in the aftermath of 9/11. The “Justice
Department inspector general’s report reviewing the detention . . . [found] that these
individuals, some 760, were denied assistance of counsel, routinely denied basic information
about why they were being held and detained excessively long – on average for three months.”
Brandon Mayfield Case, THE JOURNAL NEWS, May 26, 2004, at 6B.
130

McCullagh, supra note 58. After the government got word of several potential cases of
SARS at the popular Pasir Panjang Wholesale Market, it forcibly quarantined nearly 2,000
people who had worked at the market between April 5th and 19th. Id.
131
Paul Jacob, Draconian? Singapore is Just Doing What it Needs to Fight SARS, STRAITS
TIMES, May 3, 2003, at 1. “Singapore announced that it intends to open a camp for any of the
2,500 people under home quarantine who disobey.” Civil Liberties, supra note 124.
132

McCullagh, supra note 58.

133

Kristof, supra note 127.

134

Id.

135

Singapore has been “one of the few countries where those in charge have been quick
and just as upfront with the bitter news as they have been with the determination to fight off
the effects of the virus by any means necessary.” Jacob, supra note 131. This openness and
proactive response stands in direct contrast to China’s approach, which was wide-scale denial.
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right to travel and associate freely . . . may have spared it the worst.”136 Despite its
having experienced the third-worst outbreak of SARS in the world, Singapore’s
death rate was comparably low,137 and notably lower than the less severe outbreak
that hit North America.138 The lesson from the SARS outbreak in Singapore seems
to be that compromising on certain civil liberties can enable more effective
management of public health risks.139 However unpopular this lesson may be,
particularly in a democratic nation like the United States, it presents an unmistakable
and powerful message that should have some bearing on the shaping of United States
policy in this regard.140
B. Canada: A Democratic Approach
Canada’s reaction to SARS was very different from the authoritarian response of
Singapore. SARS first appeared in Toronto in February 2003 when an elderly
Toronto woman returned from a visit to Hong Kong infected with the disease, and
passed it on to her family.141 After several misdiagnoses and hospital transfers that
facilitated broad exposure to the deadly illness, it was properly identified as SARS,
prompting the government to take action.142
By comparison to Singapore’s approach, Canada’s reaction was sluggish and
relatively mild-mannered. The first quarantines were voluntary in nature, though
officials did have the authority to request police escorts for dangerous dissenters.143
It was several weeks, if not months, after SARS hit that Canadian officials began to
quarantine more aggressively by “cordoning off entire buildings containing infected
patients.”144 This eventually escalated to the point where hospitals were closed and
anyone having had contact with SARS patients was quarantined.145 Even the
Catholic Church began stepping in and asking worshippers to “refrain from kissing
icons, dipping their hands in holy water or sharing Communion wine.”146
In the opinion of some medical professionals, Canada’s slow yet gradually
intensifying response to SARS was at least partly responsible for the magnitude of
136

McCullagh, supra note 58.

137

It was approximately fifteen percent. Id.

138

Id.

139

Kristof, supra note 127.

140

It is important to note, however, that while an authoritarian, heavy-handed central
government has some advantages with respect to public health because of its ability to
disseminate information quickly and control its citizenry, it will not necessarily fare better
than a democratic society if, for example, it decides to hide information or misrepresent it to
the public. Much will depend, as always, on how the power is exercised.
141

Michael D. Lemonick & Alice Park, The Truth About SARS, TIME, May 5, 2003, at 48.
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Id.
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Jacob, supra note 131.

144

Civil Liberties, supra note 124.

145

Phil Thomas & Lorraine Fraser, Exiles Fleeing Hong Kong ‘Pose Threat to Health in
Britain,’ SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 6, 2003, at 17.
146

Lemonick & Park, supra note 141.
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the infection in its country.147 This resulted in its having a higher death rate than
some of the harder hit Asian countries.148 Another likely cause was the lack of
communication among public health officials across the country.149 The fact that
Canada has a federal system, like the United States, complicated matters with respect
to coordination and communication. This coordination, however, was not a problem
for the centralized government of Singapore. Overall, Canada’s approach was less
effective in controlling the illness, but also generated little strife concerning civil
rights violations because the infringements were made only where clearly
necessary.150
C. Lawrence Gostin: The Approach of a Public Health Expert
Lawrence Gostin, a renowned Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law
Center and Professor of Public Health at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health, is a leading expert and one of the foremost respected voices in the area of
public health. Through his book, Public Health Law: Duty, Power Restraint,151
Gostin sets forth a framework for what he envisions would be an effective public
health system in the United States. While a general framework does not provide the
same benefit of detailed review as a specific strategy, it is useful for illustrating
reasonable alternative approaches that have a chance of succeeding in the U.S.
democratic system.
At the heart of his book is support for model legislation that reflects the three
principles of duty, power, and restraint.152 More specifically, Gostin asserts that such
a law should impose affirmative obligations on government to promote health within
the population, and give public health authorities sufficient power to regulate actions
for the benefit of the community without permitting “overreaching in the name of
public health.”153 In order to achieve this appropriate balance of power, Gostin
provides an evaluative framework that can be systematically applied to all of the
147

Civil Liberties, supra note 124. There is some evidence that suggests that Canada’s
initially sluggish reaction to SARS may have been influenced by policy-makers’ concern for
the economy. After all, “[t]ourism is the No. 1 industry worldwide, with 2001 revenues of
more than $463 billion,” and the World Health Organization’s advisory warning against
nonessential travel to Toronto was met with outrage. “[Canadian officials] claimed that the
advisory was unwarranted . . . and would ruin their already slumping tourism business.” Jill
Schensul, SARS and the Speed of Life, TRAVEL, May 4, 2003, at 1.
148

Singapore’s death rate was only 15% whereas Canada’s was estimated at 17.5%.
McCullaugh, supra note 58.
149
One of Toronto’s disease experts had no way of getting information about the spread of
SARS to Canada’s national health agency after regular working hours. Rob Stein, SARS
Exposed World’s Weak Spots: Experts Welcome Hotline for Public Health Emergencies, New
Powers for WHO, WASHINGTON POST, June 15, 2003, at A27.
150
Another problem associated with the difficulty of communication was the reluctance of
policymakers to accurately characterize the magnitude of the problem for fear of the adverse
economic impact it could have on tourism.
151

See generally POWER, supra note 2.

152

September 11th, supra note 14, at 801.

153

Id. at 801-02.
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various sources of public health threats. It involves the following five steps: (1)
identifying existing public health risks, (2) demonstrating a particular public health
measure’s effectiveness at reducing the risk, (3) assessing the economic costs of such
an endeavor, (4) similarly assessing the degree of burden it would impose on
individuals, and (5) weighing these two to assess the overall fairness of the policy.154
Overall, Gostin’s approach seems to advocate “a carefully constrained and
narrowly delineated interventionist role for government” whenever intervention and
civil liberties come into conflict.155 He does not think that public health and
individual rights can always coexist.156 On the other hand, he also contends that the
exercise of civil liberties is only possible with security;157 therefore, almost
paradoxically, some sacrifice of liberty must be made in order to gain it. After all,
“individuals, acting alone, cannot safeguard their own health and safety, even with
full access to the sophisticated technologies of modern science and medicine.”158 In
light of this, Gostin proposes that the relevant question is not “whether libertylimiting power is ever legitimate . . . [but] what circumstance must exist to justify [a
particular] level of [governmental] authority.”159 While Gostin may not specifically
delineate where society should draw the line to balance these often opposing forces,
he advocates, at the very least, a process with greater consistency and detail in
approach than what the U.S. system has thus far exemplified, particularly in recent
years.160
VI. A FOURTH ALTERNATIVE: THE MODEL STATE
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT
Yet another alternative to the U.S. system that responded to the threats of
HIV/AIDS, 9/11, and SARS is embodied in model legislation called the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA). This model bill was drafted in the Fall
of 2001 by the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns
Hopkins Universities in response to 9/11.161 Because of some perceived ambiguity in
154

See the chart in POWER, supra note 2, at 92.
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Kapp, supra note 23, at 585.

156

Review, supra note 6, at 309.
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September 11th, supra note 14, at 801-02.
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Id. at 793.
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Lawrence O. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are Limitations On
Personal And Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2003) [hereinafter
“Limitations”]. In this paper, Gostin goes on to explain that both ends of the political
spectrum support liberty-limiting government involvement with respect to public health in
certain circumstances.
160
See Julia F. Costich, Lawrence Gostin’s Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 90
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the scope of the Commerce Clause, as compared to states’ police power, it was
drafted as a state bill, and incorporates some of Gostin’s theory because he
contributed greatly to its drafting.162 Moreover, it signals the first major shift in U.S.
public health policy away from the sickness model of health and toward
preparedness.
Very generally, MSEHPA “provides a modern framework for effective
identification and response to emerging health threats.”163 It is not meant to be
adopted in draft form by every state but, instead, is intended to be used as a
template.164 Any state adopting some version of this model legislation would assume
the responsibility of safeguarding its citizens’ public health and security, and
providing the tools with which to accomplish it.165 Among the powers that it grants
to officials in times of health crises are the power to declare a public health
emergency, the power to quarantine without a court order, the power to take and/or
condemn property as needed for the care and treatment of individuals, and the power
to force health workers to help out or risk losing their licenses.166
While these are very expansive grants of authority, they are not exercised in a
vacuum. The model act is also concerned with the protection of civil liberties.167 A
more detailed review of some of its main provisions reveals how it strikes a balance
between the breadth of these powers and individual rights.
First, while a state governor has full and sole discretion to declare a state of
emergency, which triggers a host of other powers,168 the designation automatically
terminates after thirty days unless specifically renewed, and can be overruled by a
majority vote in both chambers of a state’s legislature.169 Second, to issue a
162
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quarantine, a written, ex parte court order authorizing it must be obtained beforehand
unless “a delay . . . would pose an immediate threat to the public health.”170
However, even in cases where a delay is dangerous, a court order must be obtained
within ten days afterward.171 Third, with respect to confiscation of property for the
good of public health, MSEHPA requires the state to “pay ‘just compensation’ to the
owners of any facilities or materials that are lawfully taken or appropriated by a
public health authority for its temporary or permanent use during a state of public
health emergency.”172 Finally, although the public health authority has the power to
forcibly elicit the help of healthcare providers and negotiate their rates with the threat
of otherwise revoking their medical licenses, it balances this intrusion by holding
them harmless from liability except in cases of gross negligence or willful
misconduct.173
MSEHPA has many other provisions that, in similar fashion, attempt to balance
the more expansive authority of the government for protecting the public’s health
with more detailed measures guarding individual rights. “[V]irtually every state has
used MSEHPA as a checklist of powers…for responding to . . . public health
emergencies . . . . [and] [a]t least 20 . . . have adopted the Model Act in whole or in
part.”174 However, the model legislation has also generated much controversy, with
some of the nation’s largest and most influential states, namely: California, New
York, and Texas, all spurning it.175 This controversy is testament that, while
MSEHPA is invaluable for its identification of the difficult trade-offs inherent in
public health, if not for its overall approach to the problem in the United States, there
is room for improvement.
VII. SOME REFLECTIONS ON POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO MSEHPA
In Chinese, the word “crisis” is comprised of two symbols: danger and
opportunity.176 Applying this logic to the MSEHPA, the model legislation aimed at
public health crises, every weakness identified in the act is an opportunity for
improvement. Therefore, the best way to expand upon the solid foundation of the act
is to review and address its greatest criticisms.
One of the most dangerous and troubling aspects of the legislation is its
ambiguity in explaining some of the most controversial grants of authority, like the
ability to quarantine.177 Language such as “[t]he public health authority may . . .
establish and maintain places of isolation and quarantine, and set rules and make
orders . . . . [f]ailure to obey these rules, orders, or provisions shall constitute a

170

Bruce, supra note 164, at 86.

171

Id.

172

Id. at 84.

173

Id. at 88.

174

Terrorism, supra note 163, at 6. Every state modifies the act according to its own
constitution and public values.
175

See Kristof, supra note 127.

176

Levy, supra note 3, at 1152.

177

See Matei, supra note 68, at 442.

196

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 18:173

misdemeanor,”178 does not explain how far officials should go in keeping people out
of the quarantined area, if parents could be kept from children,179 or any other
practical details about the provision’s implementation that might better guard against
abuses. Another problem is the lack of recourse for the public against public health
officials in times of crisis except under extreme circumstances,180 i.e. in cases of
“gross negligence” or “willful misconduct”, both of which are high thresholds.181
This point is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that individuals may be
forcibly receiving medical treatment they do not want. Yet another weakness in the
legislation is that it hinges upon an identification and declaration of a public health
emergency. However, this “establishes an artificial distinction between the
functioning of the public health system during a bio-terrorist attack and the day-today functioning of the system,182 because public health crises do not often involve a
single cataclysmic event.183 Instead, the early stages of a crisis, like a bio-terrorist
attack, “mimic fairly ordinary public health situations in which illnesses that initially
seem routine strike a small number of people.”184
Accordingly, attempts at more effective and enduring reform should begin with a
framework for addressing these problematic issues. One of the best ways to resolve
the problem of ambiguity is to provide a set of guidelines, like those accompanying
the tax code, to better explain the provisions of the model law in their application to
various life situations. While states can choose to accept, reject, or modify
provisions according to their own constitutions, the guidelines should be a national
instrument that provides the public with some semblance of uniformity and
reasonable expectations a standard that could serve as a point of comparison when
investigating potential abuses of power. Additionally, choosing one public health
threat, such as a bio-terror attack for example, and examining its implications on
each of the Model Act’s provisions would be useful as a general gauge of what to
expect and what measures are unreasonable in light of the severity of the threat.
With respect to the problem of liability, would it be better to promote a sense of
fairness and accountability by lowering the threshold, with some qualifications, to
bring it in line with peacetime notions of legal actionability? Instead of drawing the
line at gross negligence, what if MSEHPA should allow suits for negligence that
would exist absent a public health emergency? Lawsuits for negligence should only
be promulgated against individual officials if they are working in their areas of
expertise and should take into account the exigencies of a public health emergency.
Otherwise, if healthcare providers are being forced to temporarily provide medical
services outside their areas of expertise due to the exigencies of the emergency and
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negligent harm results, liability should be directed toward the government.185 For
example, a medical lab technician who is asked to administer vaccines during a
public health crisis and who would not otherwise be working in such a capacity but
for the government’s request, should not be held individually liable for negligent
vaccine administration. Instead, liability should rest with the government. This
guarantees medical professionals some degree of protection, which, in turn, would
likely make healthcare providers more willing to help out, while also ensuring some
form of accountability to the public, which “is indispensable for engendering and
sustaining public trust, as well as for expressing justice.”186
Finally, a good way to approach the problem of delayed public health responses
in the absence of cataclysmic events that trigger a state of emergency declaration is
to restructure the provision. Since health officials are the most likely to detect a
public health threat, and in the best position to contain one, they should have certain
of the emergency powers, like the authority to quarantine, for example, in the first
instance. Within forty-eight hours of exercising such powers, the health officials
should have to justify their actions to an appointed commission and the governor,187
who would then either release the individuals and investigate the actions taken, or
declare a public health emergency. Abuses could be curbed through publicity for
incorrect decisions and professional consequences for officials who should have
known better. Governors would have the incentive to review potential threats
immediately,188 and the longest infringement on personal autonomy without a priori
review, would be forty-eight hours.
In addition to improving upon these identified weaknesses, there are several other
strategic steps that would likely strengthen the public health system. The first is to
have a nationwide or, if feasible, international notification system for public health
emergencies. Logistically, such a system could operate via an on-line bulletin board
that every health official would be obligated to check on an hourly basis. Details
about a public health threat, both medical and demographic, would be posted on the
computer, as well as the medical facility of origination, so that practitioners with
questions could obtain more information. The purpose of such a system would be to
disburse information about a public health threat to the largest number of health
officials in the shortest amount of time possible. It would greatly facilitate
preparedness, as well as a quick and coordinated national and international response
to the particular threat.189
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The second stratagem is an education campaign instructing the public on how the
public health response system operates, and what mechanisms are in place for their
protection. This would put any misgivings they might have about civil rights
infringements in the broader context of protecting public welfare. Moreover, the
openness of the government with respect to its plan of action would help to maintain
public trust, which is “central to controlling any outbreak.”190 After all, “it takes a
society - an informed and educated society - to practice public health.”191 In the end,
the public’s belief in the fairness of the system will go a long way, and could change
their view of objectionable provisions from being unjust assaults on civil liberties to
mere differences of opinion.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the United States moves forward in this new millennium, it is likely to
encounter many more public health threats than those faced in recent decades.
However daunting these assaults may be, the key to an effective response is
preparedness. While security almost invariably comes at a price, Americans
historically have been willing to accept reasonable restraints on liberty so long as
they were accompanied by a well-articulated need and a general consensus for
action.192 Using the lessons learned from recent threats to educate the public about
the importance of preventive initiatives for potentially less visible threats in the
future is an essential part of developing a more effective public health system. The
suggestions for preparedness outlined in this paper, which include education and
public accountability, are a definite though not decisive step in the direction of
balancing the scale of individual rights and public protection.
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